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Dreadnought: Blunder, or Stroke of Genius?

In a departure from Britain's previous reactive response to innovation in naval technology, Fisher's dreadnought policy introduced radically new capital ship designs, despite the technical risks inherent in their all-big-gun armament and turbine propulsion. Yet, early in 1905, Britain's strategic position was strong and improving further: only America was, rather slowly, working towards a small all-big-gun battleship, while Germany would not consider designs with more than four 11 inch guns until after news of Dreadnought was received. Fisher's policy had some successes, but, in too many ways, it was risky, insufficiently considered, based on inaccurate intelligence, and unnecessary.

War in History, Vol. 14, No. 2, 157-178 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0968344507075875


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